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Abstract
In early 1987 the Canadian government closed its border to 
hundreds of would-be refugees streaming north from the 
United States. Forced to flee the newly passed Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, refugees from Central America, 
Southeast Asia, and eastern Africa found themselves 
trapped between the two countries. This article examines 
the reasons for the Canadian government’s policy shift, the 
temporary refugee camp it created in upstate New York, 
and the camp’s effect on the border town of Plattsburgh, NY.
Résumé
En début 1987, le gouvernement canadien décida de fermer 
sa frontière, précédemment ouverte, à des centaines de 
réfugiés potentiels en provenance des États-Unis, obligés 
de fuir vers le nord en raison de l’adoption récente d’une 
loi sur la réforme et le contrôle de l’immigration (Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act). Des réfugiés de l’Amérique 
centrale, de l’Asie du Sud-Est, et de l’Afrique orientale se 
sont ainsi trouvés pris dans une position incertaine entre 
ces deux pays. Cet article étudie les raisons pour ce chan-
gement de politique de la part du gouvernement canadien, 
le camp de réfugiés temporaire qui en résulta dans le nord 
de l’État de New York et l’impact du camp sur la ville fron-
talière de Plattsburgh, NY.
We are in the middle of two great powers, the U.S. and Canada. 
The U.S. doesn’t want us here. Canada doesn’t want us – now any-
way. I can’t go back to Salvador. So we wait here.
—“Carlos,” March 1, 19871 
I truly believe that was Plattsburgh’s finest hour.
—Rose M. Pandozy, 
Clinton County Social Services Commissioner, 
August 3, 20122
Confused and often penniless, hundreds of would-be refugees like Carlos found themselves unexpectedly trapped between Canada and the United States. On 
February 20, 1987, Canadian immigration officials barred 
hundreds of prospective refugees from entering Canada 
until after their asylum applications had been processed, 
effectively stranding them in small communities just south 
of the U.S.-Canada border. This refusal took most refugee 
claimants from the sixteen war-torn countries on Canada’s 
B-1 list by surprise. Prior to February 20, nationals from 
countries on the B-1 list who applied for asylum at a Can-
adian port of entry were automatically accepted into Canada 
while immigration reviewed their asylum applications. The 
list reflected the Canadian government’s belief that most of 
those nationals had deserving claims for asylum. 
Canada’s suddenly closed gates shocked refugees and 
activists who knew of Canada’s previous reputation as a 
welcoming country for refugees. Just a few months prior 
to Canada’s revocation of the B-1 list, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees awarded the Canadian 
people the Fridjof Nansen Medal for outstanding service 
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to refugees, marking the first time the award was given to 
a people or government.3 This article examines why, with 
such a sterling record in refugee rights, the Canadian gov-
ernment reversed course, what happened to the refugees it 
rejected, and how the arrival of hundreds of refugees trans-
formed the communities they were stranded in.
Canada’s change in policy stemmed from a shifting 
refugee and immigration climate in Canada brought on by 
shifts in global refugee flows, administrative inefficiencies 
in Canada’s immigration office, and a public fearful of an 
“overwhelming” tide of refugees. One of the most notable 
consequences of this policy was the creation of refugee shel-
ters along the U.S.-Canada border. Particularly interesting 
is what I call the “Plattsburgh Border Crisis” in Plattsburgh, 
NY. This small town of fewer than 30,000 people suddenly 
found itself, in the spring of 1987, hosting hundreds of refu-
gees trapped between a border newly sealed by the Canadian 
government, and a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) threatening to deport them. During the course 
of four months, refugees, activists, and local government 
officials built and maintained a temporary refugee camp, 
caring for up to 200 refugees while also providing legal and 
educational services. I argue that though the Plattsburgh 
Border Crisis grew out of transnational changes in immi-
gration and refugee policy, the local response demonstrates 
the ways that refugees, public services, private charities, and 
citizens can cooperate to provide temporary refuge in spite 
of state disregard and active national hostility. In Platts-
burgh, this experience transformed both the participants 
and the region. 
A few scholars have examined the ways that U.S. and 
Canadian refugee policy shaped each other during the 1980s. 
Most notable among them is María Cristina García’s Seeking 
Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada. Some studies of U.S. and Canadian asy-
lum policy briefly mention Canada’s closing of the border in 
February 1987. In Transnational Ruptures, Catherine Nolin 
discusses how changes in U.S. immigration legislation 
in 1986 created “asylum demand” across the U.S.-Canada 
border. Julie Young’s “Seeking Sanctuary in a Border City: 
Sanctuary Movement(s) across the Canada-US Border” pays 
particular attention to the collaboration between Sanctuary 
Movement groups in Detroit and Windsor during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, briefly discussing the Canadian govern-
ment’s decision to close the border to asylum-seekers in 
1987. None of these examinations detail the effects of that 
decision on border communities, like Plattsburgh. The only 
book written specifically on Plattsburgh’s experience is a 
self-published memoir by Fran Ford, a local activist highly 
involved in refugee care.4
This article draws on newspaper reports, oral histories 
taken during two trips to the region, government archives, 
and secondary literature. The interviews cited here, as well 
as off-the-record conversations with activists and govern-
ment officials, added extra context to my research. Collect-
ively, they demonstrate how a series of legislative and policy 
decisions in Canada and the United States created the crisis, 
how a small community banded together with its resident 
refugees to meet a rapidly developing humanitarian crisis, 
and how the experience had lasting effects on its partici-
pants and the community. 
The Canadian government’s decision to close its border 
in February 1987 emanated from changes in the ways that 
the country and its citizens perceived and interacted with 
refugees from around the world. During the 1970s and 
1980s Canada resettled a significant number of refugees 
from countries like Chile and Uganda, most of whom were 
screened and selected by Canadian officials at their respect-
ive embassies. Seemingly geographically isolated from refu-
gee-generating countries, policy-makers did not expect sig-
nificant numbers of refugees to arrive on Canada’s shores or 
ports of entry. The few refugees who entered Canada unbid-
den were mostly welcomed, and deportation was relatively 
scarce. Throughout most of the 1980s, Canada deserved its 
reputation as a refugee-welcoming country, making its 1987 
change in policy so surprising to many refugees.5
In reality, the Canadian government’s decision had been 
building throughout the decade. In their sweeping history of 
Canadian immigration policy, Ninette Kelley and Michael 
Trebilcock argue, “The Immigration Department’s inability 
to handle the inland-refugee claim backlog is the dominant 
theme in Canada’s immigration history in the 1980s.”6 The 
backlog they refer to came from pending asylum applica-
tions by prospective refugees in Canada. Many applications 
remained in limbo for months, if not years, waiting for the 
claim to be adjudicated. This led, in large part, to the closing 
of the border in 1987. Three factors exacerbated the backlog 
in late 1986 and made it into a domestic crisis that required 
action: an ineffective and time-consuming adjudication 
system, well-publicized perceived “abuses” of the system, 
and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) by the United States.
The first factor, administrative inefficiencies, came 
from an overwhelmed refugee determination system that 
was never prepared for the high volume of claimants who 
arrived during the 1980s. In 1976 the Canadian government 
modernized its immigration system in an attempt to meet 
its changing workforce needs and humanitarian obligations. 
The government included a refugee measure that created a 
highly detailed and arduous two-step adjudication. A 1985 
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Canadian Supreme Court ruling, Singh v Canada, added 
another step by granting each prospective refugee the right 
to oral hearings. This quickly overwhelmed the system, cre-
ating an extensive backlog that granted any immigrant who 
claimed refugee status de facto landed status for the months, 
if not years, it took to adjudicate the claim.
In 1985 the backlog was at 3,710 applications.7 In spite 
of a partial amnesty granted to over 20,000 applicants in 
May 1986, the backlog remained at over 3,500 applications 
at the end of 1986. Canadian government officials and the 
media worried about the development and persistence of 
the backlog, as it reinforced the image of an overwhelmed 
and incompetent immigration system. Most importantly, 
in the minds of many policy-makers, the backlog prompted 
what many in the Canadian press and government called an 
abuse of the system.8 
This concern was the second factor in the closing of the 
border. In 1986, nearly 2,000 Turkish immigrants arrived 
in Canada, claiming refugee status due to economic per-
secution. Over the period of six months, 1,000 Portuguese 
Jehovah’s Witnesses asked for protection in Canada from 
religious persecution.9 The press, in conjunction with the 
Canadian government, labelled these refugees as “abusers” 
of the system, contrasting claimants fleeing peaceful but 
“under-developed” European countries with refugees from 
war-torn nations in Central America and Africa.10 The 
majority of these immigrants arrived in Canada by air. In 
response, the Canadian government started warning airline 
carriers that they bore the burden of carrying unaccepted 
asylum applicants back to their countries of birth. The 
arrival of 155 Tamils from war-torn Sri Lanka on August 11, 
1986, proved to be the most publicized “abuse” of the system. 
A number of fishermen found the Tamils off the coast of 
Newfoundland in the lifeboats that they had been forced 
into by freighter captain Wolfgang Blindel. 
The government gave “minister permits” to the Sri Lan-
kans to stay in the country for one year to wait for the vio-
lence to settle in Sri Lanka.11 This ignited a media firestorm 
with charges of “queue jumping” over other immigrants 
and worries that others would imitate the Tamil refugees. 
This intensified after the papers learned that the Sri Lankans 
had unsuccessfully claimed refugee status in West Germany 
before proceeding to Canada. For the rest of the year the 
press obsessed over the story, first focusing on the dramatic 
rescue of 155 people huddled in lifeboats by picturesque 
fishermen and then whether the Tamils should be allowed 
to stay in the country or not. Finally, the media closely fol-
lowed the government’s attempt to prosecute Blindel.12 The 
arrival of refugees continued to loom large in the public 
eye for most of 1986 and into 1987. While many Canadians 
remained concerned about refugees slowly arriving by sea 
and by air, these could be construed as isolated events that 
improved airline policies and the Canadian Coast Guard 
could control. It took one final event to prompt the Can-
adian government to close its land border with the United 
States to incoming refugees.
The third factor in the Canadian government’s closure 
of its border came from U.S. legislation. The Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 was the first major overhaul 
to the U.S. immigration system since the 1965 Immigration 
and Nationality Act. The product of a growing anti-immi-
grant groundswell within the country, the IRCA outlined 
strict penalties to those who employed undocumented 
immigrants and a road to amnesty to those who entered 
the country illegally but could prove to the government that 
they had maintained a continuous residence in the United 
States since 1982.13 In 1986 most undocumented immigrants 
did not believe that they met the criteria for amnesty, par-
ticularly those who had fled from the horrific civil wars in 
Guatemala and El Salvador but were unable to obtain refu-
gee status from the United States. Their employers, fearing 
the new employment penalties, fired many of the potential 
refugees. As a result, undocumented refugees in the United 
States faced a vexing issue. Unwilling and unable to return 
to their countries of birth, they still needed to support them-
selves and their families. Thousands turned to Canada as a 
potential safe haven after hearing of Canada’s more liberal 
asylum policies. Between December 1986, one month after 
the passage of the IRCA, and February 1987, when Canada 
closed its borders, over 10,000 would-be refugees crossed 
the border into Canada.14
For refugees the three main routes from the United States 
to Canada were Seattle to Vancouver, Detroit or Buffalo to 
Toronto, and New York, via Plattsburgh, to Montreal. Mont-
real acutely felt the influx of refugees. Its airport was already 
a primary destination for Turkish and Portuguese refugee 
applicants. Local and national newspapers ran headlines 
such as “Central Americans Pour into Canada Seeking New 
Homes,” and “Quebec Feels Budget Pinch as Refugees Keep 
Arriving.”15 The Globe and Mail cited a government estimate 
that over 1,100 new refugees had arrived during a ten-day 
span in late December and early January.16 The Toronto Star 
added another government estimate: over 600 of the year’s 
recent arrivals were Central Americans who had crossed 
the border by bus from the United States to Quebec.17 This 
only added to the widespread fears of an overwhelmed refu-
gee-determination system already established by the Tamil, 
Turkish, and Portuguese controversies. 
The government listened. On January 15, Benoit Bou-
chard, the minister for employment and immigration, told 
reporters, “The law allows the minister, while waiting to find 
the personnel necessary to deal with these cases quickly, to 
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leave those people on the other side of the border. Are we 
going to use this method? It is too soon to say.”18 A month 
later Gerry Weiner, the minister of state for immigration, 
promised changes to immigration policy that would guar-
antee “the orderly control of refugee claimants through the 
country.”19 On February 20 the government released its 
changes in refugee policy. The government established new 
visa transit requirements, ended the “minister’s permits” 
system and abolished the B-1 list.20 
A combination of an overwhelmed refugee-determin-
ation system, media coverage of “foreign refugees” arriv-
ing on Canadian shores, and a sudden influx of refugees 
brought on by U.S. immigration policy ended Canada’s B-1 
policy of allowing Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Sri Lankans, 
and nationals from thirteen other countries immediate 
entrance into Canada. Instead, the hundreds of refugees 
streaming weekly from the United States to Canada found 
themselves halted at the line between the two countries. At 
crossing stations along the border, Canadian officials inter-
viewed, processed, and then sent prospective refugees back 
to the United States to wait for a hearing date four to six 
weeks in the future. For those living in the United States 
without legal permission, this meant being sent back into 
the arms of the U.S. Border Patrol that was legally bound 
to deport them. Plattsburgh, twenty miles south of the 
main border crossing to Montreal, was on the verge of 
transforming from a sleepy community near the border to a 
makeshift refugee camp.
In late February 1987, at the Champlain border crossing, 
just twenty miles north of Plattsburgh and thirty-eight miles 
south of Montreal, Greg Ledges, supervisor and immigration 
inspector for the United States Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, heard Canada was about to close the border. 
He was unsure of the consequences. Multiple Greyhound 
buses that passed through the border checkpoint every day 
on their way to Montreal were carrying prospective refugees 
to apply for asylum in Canada. Going north, the buses never 
concerned him or his colleagues, who monitored those who 
entered the United States, not those leaving. Most people 
crossing the Champlain border passed through quickly, as 
they were either Canadian or U.S. citizens.21 
Following Minister Bouchard’s announcement on Fri-
day, February 20, Canadian immigration officials began to 
process and send potential refugees back across the border. 
Though the exact number of refugees turned away by Can-
adian officials at the Champlain border crossing over the 
weekend is unknown, one refugee relief activist in Platts-
burgh (where most of those turned away at the Champlain 
border crossing went) estimated it at over 200.22 At the 
border, refugees met with U.S. immigration officers. If refu-
gees still had documents such as a visa or temporary permit 
authorizing them to remain in the United States, INS officers 
immediately released them. Those without legal status were 
processed for deportation and were assigned either volun-
tary or involuntary departure. Migrants usually received 
involuntary departure if they had a criminal record or an 
outstanding deportation order.
Canadian activists charged that refugees forced to wait 
in the United States by Canada’s policy change were in dan-
ger of deportation back to their home country. When first 
announcing the change in policy, Bouchard told the press 
and members of the opposition party that migrants were 
safe from deportation, but a few days later, after newspapers 
published a letter from the head of the INS contradicting 
Bouchard’s claim, he retracted his comments.23
The U.S. Border Patrol sent involuntary deportees to 
prison to await transit back to their home countries, while 
those eligible for voluntary deportation received papers and 
were told to leave the United States by a certain date. As Mr. 
Ledges remembered it, the entire process from crossing the 
border into Canada through Canadian processing and U.S. 
processing, to either release or imprisonment, could take 
longer than ten hours.24 Following processing, churches, 
non-profits, and government agencies could legally assist 
migrants. For a variety of organizations in Plattsburgh who 
offered prospective refugees protection, this was an import-
ant distinction. IRCA, which most of the refugees were flee-
ing, made it a penalty to “conceal, harbor, or shield from 
protection” undocumented and unprocessed immigrants.25 
Processing by the Border Patrol legally shielded Plattsburgh 
organizations.
The village of Champlain, a small cluster of houses and 
businesses just south of the Canadian/U.S. border, had no 
place for rejected refugees to stay, so those who did not go 
to jail received a bus ride back to Plattsburgh, the nearest 
U.S. town.26 Though larger than Champlain, Plattsburgh 
claimed fewer than 30,000 residents. Its economic main-
stays came from a U.S. Air Force base and a branch of the 
State University of New York (SUNY Plattsburgh). In addi-
tion, it remains the closest U.S. city of any size to Montreal. 
Canadians in search of U.S. goods or services often shopped 
in Plattsburgh. In turn, Plattsburgh residents often took 
trips north to Montreal to watch Major League Baseball’s 
Montreal Expos. Plattsburgh was, in many ways, a quintes-
sential border town. Yet, because traffic across the border 
was relatively unrestricted, the border did not loom large in 
the city’s imagination. The residents prided themselves in 
their community’s hospitality, a virtue that the border crisis 
tested tremendously in early 1987.
For the first few months following IRCA’s passage, a grow-
ing stream of immigrants and refugees passed through 
Plattsburgh, but the numbers remained small and their stay 
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short. On February 21, refugees turned back at the U.S.-
Canada border began to arrive in Plattsburgh in numbers 
the town had never seen before. The Plattsburgh Border 
Crisis had begun. 
The Plattsburgh Community Crisis Center (PCCC) 
responded first. Founded in 1970, the PCCC, headed by Brian 
Smith, offered assistance to homeless, impoverished, and 
mentally ill Plattsburgh residents. It proved to be a crucial 
part of Plattsburgh’s refugee relief effort. During first few 
days of the crisis, the PCCC took the lead. After learning that 
refugees were stranded at the local bus station, Brian Smith 
and the centre swung into action, housing refugees at local 
motel rooms and providing them with food. On Monday, 
February 23, the local Plattsburgh Press-Republican printed 
a front-page story about the refugees’ arrival, announcing 
the onset of the crisis and the actions taken up to that point. 
It was quickly becoming clear that the centre did not have 
the resources for the emerging crisis. Most importantly, 
it did not have the space to house, nor the money to sup-
port, incoming refugees. As the border crisis evolved, other 
involved organizations included the Salvation Army, the 
Red Cross, Clinton County Social Services, Catholic Char-
ities, and the Ecumenical Food Shelf. Within the first week 
Rose Pandozy, the Clinton County social services commis-
sioner, formed a committee with the department heads of 
the various services. As Pandozy remembers it, the cooper-
ation between local service organizations was seamless. 
Throughout the refugee relief effort, “If we knew we needed 
another agency, we just called them up and they came.”27 
Plattsburgh community leaders decided to set up an emer-
gency shelter at the Salvation Army to provide more space 
for refugees and to conserve fast-dwindling resources.28
The new shelter at the Salvation Army had the capacity 
to house approximately 100 refugees. While enough for the 
first few days of the crisis, it soon reached capacity. Brian 
Smith, Rose Pandozy, and other leaders of the refugee relief 
effort began looking for other options. On February 27 they 
found a temporary solution at a local building called “The 
Office” that housed 90 more. While the building provided 
a place for people to sleep, it lacked beds, showers, and a 
kitchen. Thus, volunteers had to transport sheltered refu-
gees back and forth for showers and bring food. Clearly, 
this was not a permanent solution. Smith and Pandozy kept 
looking.29
Volunteers and local government officials began to pub-
licly express anger over the lack of state and federal sup-
port. One unnamed charity head complained in the local 
newspaper, “It’s a sad thing. The government created this 
problem, but they’re dumping all the responsibility on the 
poor people of a small community.”30 That very day a local 
National Guard unit offered to temporarily house refugees 
in its armoury. Refugees could stay in the armoury only 
while the unit could guarantee the site’s security. Therefore, 
when the unit left for military manoeuvres in two weeks, 
the community had to find alternative housing. Though 
grateful for help from the state, the refugee relief leaders 
were desperate to secure permanent assistance. To make 
matters worse, the leaders had no way of ascertaining the 
scope of the crisis. As William Donnell, the coordinator of 
Plattsburgh’s Office of Emergency Preparedness, explained, 
“Weeks from now we could have 200 or even 300 [refugees]. 
We have to stay prepared.”31
Three days later the National Guard at Saranac Lake, a 
village over fifty miles away in Franklin County, extended 
an invitation for refugees to stay at its armoury. After long 
deliberation, the relief leaders rejected its offer. Upon inves-
tigating the location, they found its facilities and location 
unsuitable. Too far away from social services and without 
sufficient facilities to safely house refugees, the armoury 
would be a logistical nightmare.32 
On March 4 leaders finally secured a solution that lasted 
through May. The Association for Retarded Children 
(ARC) offered its new building just west of the city. The 
30,000-square-foot building could house over 150 refu-
gees and had facilities for showers and cooking. Yet it was 
little more than an empty shell. The cavernous main room 
offered little privacy for families. Activists set up “privacy 
cubicles” throughout the main room. Three walls with a 
sheet in the front, they offered a measure of seclusion. In 
addition, the refugee relief effort needed to build showers 
and provide additional toilets, washers, and dryers. While 
imperfect, the ARC meant an end to the shuttling of refugees 
back and forth. The improvements came to approximately 
$60,000. Rose Pandozy, who by this time had taken the lead 
in the refugee relief effort, believed that she could secure 
assistance from the state.33 
Pandozy travelled to Albany on March 5 to meet with 
New York’s Department of Social Services and ask for help. 
The commissioner told her there was no assistance available. 
Pandozy asked for the decision in writing so she could share 
it with the local, state, and international reporters who were 
already starting to come to Plattsburgh. Though Pandozy 
never released a statement to the media, this threat had 
the desired effect. On March 6 New York Governor Mario 
Cuomo released $177,000 in emergency funds to Clinton 
County to help provide for the refugees.34
Two days later the refugees moved into the ARC shelter. 
For the next three months the ARC building served as the 
sole shelter for refugees in Plattsburgh awaiting their hear-
ing. On June 10 the housing situation for the refugee relief 
effort went full circle. The ARC moved into its new build-
ing, and most refugees returned to local motels. A few 
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temporarily moved in with host families who housed the 
refugees while awaiting their hearing. 
During the three months in the ARC, local government 
officials, refugees, and volunteers interacted in fascinating 
ways. Each of the three groups had varying, though overlap-
ping, views of how the community should respond to the 
Plattsburgh Border Crisis. The three leading government/
semi-government officials, Pandozy, Brian Smith, and Cap-
tain Jack Holcomb of the Salvation Army, saw the shelter 
as the answer to a humanitarian crisis that needed support. 
Largely bereft of assistance from state or federal authorities, 
Pandozy and Smith took the lead in determining how to pay 
for shelter, food, and medical assistance for an unknown 
number of refugees. It was not an easy task, as the number 
of refugees fluctuated wildly over the first few months, as 
did their medical needs. At one point Holcomb predicted 
over 500 refugees.35 Nonetheless, Smith and Pandozy found 
the funds through a skilful use of political persuasion (see 
Pandozy’s trip to Albany) and cooperation with local char-
ities and fundraising.
As the leader of the local Salvation Army chapter, Hol-
comb took charge of the day-to-day operations of the shelter. 
One of the most quoted figures in the media reports on the 
relief effort, some volunteers expressed unhappiness with 
Holcomb’s brusque demeanour and perceived tendency to 
spend more time with reporters than at the shelter.36 Hol-
comb was, without a doubt, a formidable presence. A number 
of interviewees recalled an incident at the shelter in late May 
when Holcomb called the entire building for a meeting. He 
sternly excoriated unnamed individuals for keeping alcohol 
in the shelter, general rowdiness, and invasions of privacy. 
The most memorable part came when he halted his address 
to search a young man’s cubicle. Holcomb found a quart of 
liquor. In stony silence he marched across the main room 
into the men’s bathroom and poured the alcohol down the 
drain, then re-emerged to hurl the empty bottle into the 
trash.37 Following the closure of the shelter in June 1987, Hol-
comb’s role in the refugee relief effort shrank, as he was no 
longer responsible for the day-to-day care of the refugees.
While government and closely allied officials oversaw the 
setup and overall operation of the shelter, its residents made 
it work.38 During the shelter’s three months, the plurality 
of refugees came from Central America. Individuals from 
around the globe joined them. Refugees arrived in vary-
ing socio-economic circumstances, some able to provide 
for themselves, while others came with little more than 
the clothes on their backs.39 Language skills varied widely. 
While many of the refugees were fluent in English, others 
only spoke Spanish, French, Arabic, Tamil, Amharic, or 
other languages. Similarly, many refugees entered the shel-
ter in desperate need of medical attention.40 
The one thing in common for refugees arriving in the 
first few weeks was that they did not expect to be in Platts-
burgh. An invisible line, manned by Canadian immigration 
officials, kept them in the United States. Waiting at the shel-
ter for their applications to be adjudicated, they negotiated 
and created a safe space on a shoestring budget. Frustrated, 
confused, and desperate, refugees worked with volunteers 
and government officials at the shelter to create a space that 
provided temporary routines in their new lives.
These new routines included volunteering around the 
shelter. Some refugees offered to cook. Though it presented 
a unique challenge due to varying dietary restrictions and 
preferences, cooking provided a diversion from the mon-
otony of waiting for adjudication. Others cleaned, babysat, 
helped with paperwork, and volunteered to conduct security 
patrols. As the shelter population grew to over 150, security 
became a concern. Initially, volunteers from the Salvation 
Army and local community conducted patrols through the 
shelter, but the refugees quickly took control themselves.41 
One Salvadoran, “Oscar,” led in the organization of security 
patrols. Well respected by the other refugees, Oscar came 
from a middle-class background and had extensive business 
experience, as well as a master’s from Michigan State. For 
the month that he lived in the shelter Oscar drafted the lists 
for the work crews and helped set up security patrols.42
Refugees also organized special events and classes, which 
included talent shows, picnics, and a Mother’s Day celebra-
tion. At the conclusion of a talent show on March 19 the 
refugees sang “God Bless America,” an interesting choice, 
given that most were fleeing U.S. immigration laws.43 
Though most of the refugees in Plattsburgh wanted to settle 
in francophone Quebec, few knew how to speak French. 
Walid Houri, a Lebanese refugee, conducted free introduc-
tory French classes to all who needed them.44 
In addition to doing volunteer work, many refugees gave 
individual and group interviews to the press. Newspaper 
reporters and television crews from across the United States, 
Canada, and the rest of the world discovered Plattsburgh’s 
charm and found themselves fascinated by its residents and 
the refugees who were forced to temporarily call it home. 
Immediately after the crisis began, the Montreal Gazette 
published a front-page story called “Dreams of New Life 
Shattered at Border,” with a picture of two young Salva-
dorans and the caption “My life is in danger and I can’t go 
back.”45 The Gazette continued its coverage and was joined 
by other national and international outlets including the 
Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, New York Times, and Phila-
delphia Inquirer, as well as distributors like the Associated 
Press and United Press International. Refugees used these 
interviews as opportunities to make a political statement, 
highlighting the reasons for their flight and the injustices 
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of the U.S. and Canadian refugee systems. Through chores, 
talent shows, and interviews, refugees transformed the shel-
ter from a space born out of necessity into a sanctuary and 
site of political action.
While refugees provided stirring images and heart-
breaking quotes, reporters also took interest in the plain-
speaking volunteers who staffed the refugee relief effort. 
They had good reason to. One of the most fascinating parts 
of the Plattsburgh Border Crisis was the way that members 
of a relatively conservative rural community responded to 
an unforeseen, and, for many, unwelcome, emergency. At 
first, the unknown aspects of the crisis intimidated many 
Plattsburgh and Clinton County residents, even those who 
agreed to volunteer. Fran Ford, who went on to become one 
of the shelter’s most prolific volunteers, remembers taking 
two refugees to the doctor’s office on her first day: “I took a 
seat across the room, the farthest chair I could find. Why? 
Was I embarrassed to be seen with these women that were 
different in language and appearance? Yes I was!”46 Within 
a few weeks Mrs. Ford went from answering phones to serv-
ing as a jack of all trades, running errands with refugees, 
counselling deeply scarred women, inviting refugees over 
for dinner, and serving as a go-between for volunteers and 
government officials.47 
Margot Zeglis, who went on to become the relief effort’s 
volunteer coordinator, moved to Plattsburgh into the midst 
of the crisis. She recalls that she and her husband “drove into 
town in a big snowstorm, stayed in a hotel and I heard about 
the need for volunteers and that’s how I got involved.” A vet-
eran of a variety of non-profits, Zeglis used her experience 
to organize the effort’s volunteers. She describes recruiting, 
training and placing volunteers as a series of questions: 
“Well, start with their names: what do you like to do? And 
then … putting out a range of what are the immediate needs, 
and trying to fit people who want to do those. A volunteer 
is a pretty valuable asset, and you only asked of them what 
they want to do.” The range of volunteers surprised her: “All 
ages, financial backgrounds. Religions. I was amazed by 
how many men there were. Usually you don’t get a lot of 
men but we had a lot of men as volunteers. And husbands 
and wives.”48 Local Plattsburgh businesses answered the 
call as well. The owner of a muffler shop donated his time 
and money, while other local businesses donated food and 
clothing.49
The academic community got involved as well. Profes-
sors from SUNY Plattsburgh offered translation and para-
legal services. A variety of Plattsburgh undergraduates, 
members of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity, as well as high 
school Model UN students raised money for the refugees. 
For some Plattsburgh undergraduates this represented a 
unique opportunity, as they were participating in a Model 
Organization of the American States (OAS) and had just 
been chosen to represent El Salvador. The faculty leader of 
the Model OAS, Stuart Voss, worked as a paralegal for many 
refugees. At the shelter, students met and interacted with 
refugees to supplement their learning.50
In addition, volunteers from outside the immediate com-
munity responded. During the first weekend of the crisis, 
residents of Hemmingford, a village less than five miles 
north of the border, drove a Volkswagen bus stuffed with 
food and clothing down to the Crisis Center. Disagreeing 
with their government’s policy, they returned the following 
weekend, providing entertainment and religious services.51 
The interviews and media coverage of the refugees and vol-
unteers and Plattsburgh touched concerned citizens across 
the United States, who took to the media, writing letters 
to the editor and publishing articles in an attempt to raise 
money and awareness for the Plattsburgh volunteer groups. 
Nancy Murray, president of the Syracuse Interreligious 
Council, issued an explicitly religious appeal for financial 
support, asserting that, like the Israelites wandering in the 
desert after fleeing Egypt, “today’s strangers in a foreign land 
need our manna to survive.”52 Donations began streaming 
in, first from around the region and then the country. 
Of course not everyone in the community responded 
positively to the crisis. There were concerns similar to those 
in Canada that had led to the closing of the border. Some 
Plattsburgh residents questioned the wisdom of expending 
so many resources on refugees while Plattsburgh residents 
went hungry and homeless. One letter to the editor claimed, 
“The refugee problem could easily be solved by taking the 
money for one day’s maintenance and buying each refugee 
who can’t afford one a one-way ticket to Albany along with 
a map [to the] State Campus and the South Mall.”53 Other 
letters echoed the sentiment. Nonetheless, future events 
proved that. though the refugee relief effort came with some 
initial costs, it generated several unexpected benefits.
The most tangible benefit came a little more than seven 
months after the letter to the editor quoted above. Tiny 
Clinton County secured a $1 million grant from New York 
State’s Homeless and Housing Assistance Program. It was 
the third-largest grant for the program, only behind the 
much more populated regions of New York City and West-
chester County. Brian Smith and Rose Pandozy, the authors 
of the grant proposal, credited Plattsburgh’s response to the 
refugee crisis to their luck with the proposal.54 Three years 
later Smith, Pandozy and other community leaders dedi-
cated the Evergreen Townhouse Community, an innova-
tive grant-funded low-income housing complex. The grant 
increased by $700,000 to $1.7 million to make, in the words 
of State Social Services Commissioner Cesar A. Perales, “a 
little community of its own.”55 The Evergreen Townhouse 
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Community remains a crucial part of Clinton County’s and 
Plattsburgh’s social services.
Other, less tangible effects on the community included 
a broadening of horizons by area churches and residents 
who had raised funds, clothing, and food during the relief 
effort. Prior to the border crisis, people of the community 
thought of themselves as friendly and neighbourly, but the 
refugee relief effort was demonstrable proof of those virtues 
to themselves and the world. Today the First Presbyterian 
Church in Plattsburgh has extensive outreach programs at 
home and abroad. Mission of Hope, a charity centred in 
Plattsburgh, makes yearly visits to Nicaragua for humani-
tarian and missionary work.56
In this article’s second opening quotation, Rose Pandozy 
calls the response to the Plattsburgh Border Crisis the com-
munity’s “finest hour.” Various members of the community, 
when interviewed, echoed her sentiment. They believed that 
the willingness of the town’s and county’s social service 
organizations to band together to meet a crisis proved the 
area’s hospitality. Volunteer coordinator Margot Zeglis 
lauded Plattsburgh’s response, “Plattsburgh has a lot to be 
very proud of. They really, really rose above it all.”57
The crisis also formed lasting friendships among Platts-
burgh residents while spending long hours at the shelter, 
grieving the fate of family members, laughing over the 
inanities of everyday life, and inviting refugees over for din-
ner. While conducting interviews in Plattsburgh, many of 
the activists referred me to their fellow volunteers, indicat-
ing that nearly thirty years after the crisis, they remained 
in touch. They mentioned recent dinners or coffee meetings 
between fellow activists who are now old friends.58
A little over a year after the shelter’s closing, many of 
the refugees, volunteers, and local government officials 
reunited in Montreal for a picnic. Organized by Fran Ford, 
Margot Zeglis, and the Kiwanis Clubs of Plattsburgh and 
Montreal, the August 21, 1988, picnic was, for many refugees 
and volunteers, the first they had seen of each other after 
refugees left the shelter. Refugees, activists, and government 
officials filled the day with song, laughter, good food, and 
a special visit from Santa Claus. Even though it was in the 
middle of the summer, Ron Wood, a Plattsburgh volunteer, 
reprised his role as St. Nicholas, which he had played at a 
party for the refugees last Christmas.59
That picnic in August of 1988 did not end Plattsburgh’s 
interactions with refugees. To this day, Plattsburgh remains 
a way station for prospective refugees intent on applying for 
asylum in Canada. Yet the picnic is a powerful reminder that 
the crisis was, in many ways, overcome by the generosity 
of and cooperation between refugees, volunteers, and local 
government officials. While they did not end the refugee 
flow or change Canadian policy, these three groups found a 
way to transform a desperate situation into a negotiable one. 
None of the refugees who came knocking at Plattsburgh’s 
door starved or went homeless. The “tide of refugees” never 
overwhelmed Plattsburgh’s social services. Rather, it led 
to the construction of top-of-the-line low-income housing. 
And while some citizens expressed discomfort over the aid 
given to refugees, in the end the experience became one of 
civic pride that the community still remembers fondly.
The Plattsburgh Border Crisis also temporarily trans-
formed Plattsburgh, as a space, into a hub of global networks. 
Civil wars in Central America, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, 
and Africa pushed refugees out of local camps and into 
Western countries. Policy and legislation in Canada and 
the United States forced refugees from their homes across 
the United States and into a collection of border zones in 
Seattle, Detroit, Buffalo, and Plattsburgh, where they waited 
for the Canadian government to decide their fate. As these 
border zones struggled to deal with the ramifications of 
these changes brought on by an ineffective refugee adjudica-
tion system, a panicked Canadian media, and the IRCA, the 
Canadian government tabled its new proposal for refugee 
adjudication, C-55, supplemented by an anti-smuggling bill 
(C-84) in early summer of 1987. 
Noteworthy among Bill C-55’s statutes was the “safe third 
country” provision, which denied asylum applicants if they 
had already passed through what was deemed a safe third 
country. Refugee advocates feared that for foreign policy 
reasons the government would deem the United States a 
“safe country,” thereby making the vast majority of Central 
American applicants ineligible. Though Bills C-55 and C-84 
passed in July 1988, the Canadian government never com-
piled the safe third country list, sparing Canadian officials 
the embarrassment of excluding the United States.60 This 
further proved that Canada’s government needed to take a 
global, rather than domestic approach to its immigration, 
refugee, and asylum policy. The local and international 
forces that caused the Plattsburgh Border Crisis continued, 
just like the friendships and goodwill that it created.
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